Abstract-Often in the development of a biometric product an evaluator of the system is the same entity who developed the algorithm. Moreover, usually the test data employed in such evaluation is also collected by the same developer/evaluator.
I. INTRODUCTION
Often in the development of a biometric product the eval uator of the system is the same institution who developed the algorithm. Furthermore, usually the test data employed in such evaluation is also collected by the same developer/evaluator and in most cases such database will not be pUblic. Con sequently, test results cannot be verified by independent in stitutions. Although this can be justifiable (e.g. in the opti mization phase of an algorithm), from the perspective of a potential customer it reduces trustworthiness of the developed system and reported performances. Therefore, for evaluating recognition performance of biometric components and sys tems the availability of independent databases and desirably independent evaluators are very important. Both databases of significant size and independent testing institutions provide the precondition for fair and unbiased benchmarking. In order to show generalization capabilities of the system under test, it is essential that algorithm developers do not have access to the testing database and thus the risk of tuned algorithms is 978-1-4244-6588-0/10/$25.00 ©2010 IEEE Report categories generated by algorithm developer and system evaluator having different access types to the test databases.
minimized. Figure 1 depicts various types of performance evaluation reports to the customers ("CUSTOMERS") that can be pro duced by the algorithm developer ("ALG-DEV") and system evaluator (" SY S-EVAL"). Each of them has different types of access to the test databases ("DB-TEST 1" and "DB-TE ST 2"). In this example, the system evaluator has full read access to both of the test databases while the algorithm developer has only read access to the first database but not to the second one. In this figure we also assume that "ALG-DEV" and "SYS EVAL" are independent entities, and the former provides their (binary) algorithms to the latter. Then, from the customer point of view, in terms of trustworthiness the three produced reports (in Figure 1) can have the following ranking:
• (least trustable) Performance report 1 (on DB 1),
• (medium trustable) Performance report 2 (on DB 1),
• (most trustable) Performance report 3 (on DB 2). This paper presents the "Report 3" category (from Figure 1 ) on a fingerprint performance evaluation that has been generated in the context of the TURBINE project [1] , [2] . This perfor mance report is the result of the first phase (i.e. not final) testing in TURBINEl. The tests are carried out in technology testing which is an offline evaluation of biometric system or component using a pre-existing corpus [3] . In particular, the "SY S-EVAL" represented by GUC (Gj0vik University Col lege) as a neutral academic partner in the project. The "ALG DEV" is represented by project partners (Sagem Securite, Precise Biometrics, Philips Research Europe and University of Twente) and also by an external party Neurotechnology. As a "DB-TEST 2" we used the GUC100 multi-scanner fingerprint database which was composed by the GUC team, and members of " ALG-DEV" category did not have access to it. An example of "DB-TEST I" database can be FVC2000 [4] . In addition, we report scenarios where there can be significant differences between algorithm and system performances. According to a taxonomy of offline tests in [5] , our evaluation can be classified as "independent -strongly supervised" where all tests are carried out solely by system evaluator in its premises and hardware (computers), and submitted algorithms compliant to a specified protocol.
The rest of the paper is structured as follow. Section II outlines biometric template protection concept. Section III provides an overview of the main performance metrics in biometric systems, and also introduces an updated definition for FTA. Section IV gives an overview of the test database and used fingerprint verification packages. Then, Section V present performance evaluation results both at the minutiae (unprotected) and pseudonymous identifier (protected) levels. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. BIOMETRIC TEMPLATE PROTECTION
Biometric performance testing becomes a more complex issue, when an additional level of biometric references, namely pseudonymous identifiers (PI), are evaluated. These are com plementary to image-based or minutiae-based references. The PI references provide a level that is both more privacy protective and more efficient than symmetric or asymmetric encryption of a biometric reference image or minutiae template record [6] , [7] , [8] , [9] , [10] . With pseudonymous identifiers an individual retains complete control of its biometric data as multiple pseudonymous identifiers can be generated from a single biometric characteristic without any risk that these can be linked together. At the same time any of these identifiers can be canceled and replaced by a new one if needed. Re search on such pseudonymous identifiers is a core objective of the TURBINE project. The goal of this research project is to provide significant privacy advances over currently used biometric systems. It is also worth mentioning that in this paper we only report "biometric performance/analysis" per se of the algorithms. The "security performance/analysis" of the PI algorithms is evaluated by others in TURBINE [1] . Furthermore, the template protection concept has now been incorporated in to the corresponding ISO standardization [11] .
While the advantages of a biometric template protection are attractive, the complexity of testing such systems is beyond the challenges of testing the interoperability performance on the minutiae level. Figure 2 illustrates the interoperability schemas for minutiae level testing (Figure 2 (a)) and our proposed schema for PI level testing (Figure 2(b) ). In these figures, blue and yellow components are the sensor (S) and finger print image (FP), and minutiae encoder (MTE) and encoded minutiae template (T), respectively. The red components in Figure 2 (b) are pseudonymous identifiers encoder (PIE) and encoded template (PI). The green modules are the minutiae (MTC) and PI comparators (PIC). The superscripts (p) and (s) indicate whether generated template (or encoder) is proprietary or standard ones, respectively. The left and right parts of com parators (both MTC and PIC) are enrollment and verification phases, respectively. The subscripts A, B and C denote some arbitrary suppliers. It should be stated that up to now there is no interoperability on the PI-level. However, given the large number of open systems the impact of various interoperable components (fingerprint sensors and minutiae extractors) on the performance of PI-encoders and comparators is relevant and of interest in this paper.
III. PERFORMANCE MET RICS
The main error types associated with any biometric per formance are FMR (False Match Rate) versus FNMR (False Non-match Rate), and FAR (False Accept Rate) versus FRR (False Reject Rate). In this paper we will refer to the former and latter pairs as algorithm and system performances (or errors), respectively. Algorithm errors (i.e. FRM and FNMR) are estimated using genuine and impostor comparison scores. Then, system error can be computed based on algorithm errors according to the below equations2 [12] :
The initial definition of a failure-to-acquire rate (FTA) in ISO 19795-1 :2006 was stating: "proportion of verification or identification attempts for which the system fails to capture or locate an image or signal of sufficient quality.". Nowadays it is more expressive to consider the FTA along the concepts of the ISO Harmonized Biometric Vo cabulary [13] , which defines failure to acquire as ''failure to accept for subsequent comparison the output of a data capture process.". Then, FTA is resulted in a definition as: "proportion of a specified set of acquisitions that were failures to acquire." [13] . This includes failure to capture and other possible problems of a generated biometric sample such as poor signal quality or algorithmic deficiencies. In an operational testing this can be observed and distinguished for, on the one hand, an error that occurs during enrollment, while generating the template (biometric reference). On the other hand an error that occurs during verification while generating a probe that shall be compared to a stored template. However, for technology testing the biometric samples are processed to templates (and further to pseudonymous identifiers) and the assignment to a minutiae feature vector being reference or probe is deferred to the testing routine. In our tests, we define FTA using equation 3. Besides the trustworthiness of performance reports, another important aspect that is usually neglected or ignored in reports is a distinction between algorithm (FMRlFNMR) and system (FARlFRR) performances. In performance reports rarely both of these two performance (error) types are provided. This can be justifiable in small scale biometric performance evaluations the FTA is often zero or very small. In such cases distinc tion between algorithm performance and system performance is none or insignificant (according to equations 1 and 2). However, in medium or large scale performance testing the value of FTA can be far from zero which then contributes to a significant difference between algorithm and system performances (errors). Section V provides examples of such significant differences between two performance types.
IV. FINGERPRINT ALGORIT HMS AND TEST DATABASE
Fingerprint verification algorithms in the TURBINE project are provided by project partners, in particular Sagem Securite, Precise Biometrics, Philips Research Europe and University of Twente. An external fingerprint verification package by Neurotechnology (VeriFinger which is commercially available at [14] ) is also included in the testing.
The submitted PI algorithm for the first benchmark encom passes software which simulates the effect of a physical pro tection layer obtained when implementing encoding and com parison within a smartcard (on-card-comparison techniques).
As a test database we use the GUC100 multi-scanner fingerprint database which was collected by using six different fingerprint scanners (TST BiRD 3, L-1 DFR 2100, Cross Match L SCAN 100, Precise 250 MC, Lumidigm V 100 and Sagem MorphoSmart). Over several months fingerprint images of all 10 fingers from 100 subjects on all 6 scanners were acquired. The data collection was conducted in an indoor en vironment and each subject attended 12 sessions. The average time interval between each session was about one week which allows natural variability of finger condition to occur. In total, GUC100 consists of almost 72000 fingerprint images. More information about the database and its availability to others for testing can be found at [15] .
Neither project partners nor external parties had access to the GUC100 database or were involved in the testing activity. All (binary) fingerprint verification algorithms were submitted to GUC and Neurotechnology's VeriFinger was purchased. Then, performance evaluation tests were carried out solely by the GUC research team as an independent and neutral academic party in the project. For performance evaluation pur poses the GUC team developed a test tool which implements pre-defined test protocols.
V. PERFORMANCE RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The focus of this paper is not on comparing individual performances of fingerprint verification software packages or scanners but rather emphasizing characteristics of biometric performance evaluation and observing the potential perfor mance degradation in the transition to the pseudonymous identifier level. Therefore, the names of scanner and algorithm suppliers are anonymized in the performance plots. Test results are given in terms of FMR vs. FNMR DET-curves (algorithm performance) and FAR vs. FRR DET curves (system perfor mances). At the minutiae level curves x-axis are plotted in logarithmic scale.
A. Results at the minutiae level Figure 3 shows results of algorithm and system perfor mance evaluations using algorithms from the aforementioned suppliers on the GUC100 database at minutiae level, which is unprotected from a data privacy perspective. In this figure (and also in Figure 4 ) in every plot performance curves are depicted for each scanners denoted as Sl, ... , S6. In addition, in this figure (and also in Figure 4 ) due to unsuitability of the algorithms by suppliers X and Z to generate minutiae templates for images stemming from scanner S6, performance on this scanner are not reported. The estimated EER and FNMR (FRR) at 0.1 % FMR (FAR) of the curves are also shown in the legend of the plots. Figure 4 presents results of same performance evaluations (as in Figure 3 ) but now by taking into account the image qual ity. We used NFlQ algorithm [16] for estimating fingerprint image quality. For each fingerprint image the NFlQ algorithm produces a number 1 (best quality), 2, 3, 4 or 5 (poorest quality). We selected NFIQ value 3 as a quality threshold, i.e. fingerprint images with NFIQ score 4 or 5 are considered as having insufficient quality and counted in FTC.
As one can observe from Figures 3 the difference between algorithm and system performances is insignificant when ig noring image quality (i.e. FT A � 0). However, a very significant performance difference can be noticed when taking into account the image quality (i.e. FT A =1= 0) as indicated in Figures 4 . In large scale biometric testing failures, whether hardware related (e.g. sensor not capturing sufficient quality biometric sample) or software related (e.g. encoder not being able to extract features), are inevitable. Therefore, in such tests it is very important to present both algorithm and system performances.
For the public algorithm Neurotechnology the best bio metric performance on the minutiae level (with good quality images) is achieved with sensor S3 with a FNMR of 0.57% at a FMR of 0.1 % (see Figure 4(e) ). Most of other numbers (es pecially system performance numbers) are significantly worse which indicate the level of difficulty of the GUClOO database. This can be due to the extreme variations of the environmental conditions during the capture process (e.g. cold and dry winter conditions in Norway).
B. Results at the PI level Figure 5 shows the first phase performance evaluation results at the pseudonymous identifier level. At this level performance tests were conducted without considering the image quality of a processed sample. In Figure 5 performances are presented only using images from scanners S2, S4 and S6. Performance plots in Figure 5 indicate that performance deterioration can occur from minutiae level to PI level.
For each test scenario at the PI level the testing time is significantly higher than at the minutiae level. Thus, the number of points in PI level DET curves are limited (seven in Figure 5 ). Also because of small number of points, the single number performance indicators (e.g. EER) are not estimated neither.
It is worth to emphasize that these performance plots are results of the first testing round in TURBINE which are not final results of the project. For the second and final testing round, project partners will submit their improved algorithms, and its results will be available in year 2011.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we presented an independent report on the first phase performance evaluation of fingerprint verification algo rithms in the context of the TURBINE project. Performance testing was conducted both at the minutiae and pseudonymous identifier levels using project partners and external parties (binary) algorithms on the GUClOO database. The GUClOO database consisted of almost 72000 fingerprint images from 100 individuals which were collected using six different fin gerprint scanners during several months in Norway. Neither project partners nor external parties had access to this database or were involved in the testing activity. All the performance evaluation tests were conducted independently by a neutral academic party in the project. In the second phase of testing in TURBINE it is aimed to further improve performance accuracies of the algorithms.
In biometric systems for increasing the trustworthiness of the performance report for potential customers of the system, performance evaluations are highly recommended/desired to be conducted by an independent third party institution. We also emphasize that the distinction between system perfor mance (FAR vs. FRR) and algorithm performance (FMR vs. FNMR) needs to be made. This is important especially in large scale performance evaluation of biometric component or system where failures, whether hardware related (e.g. sensor not capturing sufficient quality biometric sample) or software related (e.g. encoder not being able to extract features), are inevitable. 
